Security
U.S.-India Nuclear Deal Threatens International Security
The U.S.-India nuclear deal threatens American and global security by enabling the significant expansion of nuclear weapons production capability and the production of nuclear weapons material in India while undermining U.S. and international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Rewards and expands India’s nuclear arsenal
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By enabling India to import uranium fuel for its nuclear power plants, the agreement would allow India to redirect its limited supplies of indigenous uranium (which India currently must divide between weapons production and electricity generation) for dedicated use in its military program. According to estimates by a former Indian intelligence official and by the International Panel on Fissile Material, India could boost its nuclear weapons production from its current production capability of 6-12 weapons a year to 40-50 weapons a year under the proposed agreement.
Even if India places 14 out of 22 reactors under safeguards, the bottom line will be increased nuclear weapons production capability for India.
K. Subrahmanyam, former head of India's National Security Advisory Board, stated in the Indian press that “Given India's uranium ore crunch and the need to build up our minimum credible nuclear deterrent arsenal as fast as possible, it is to India's advantage to categorize as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refueled by imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapons grade plutonium production.”
Threatens to ignite a South Asian nuclear arms race
In addition, the proposed 123 agreement would allow India to reprocess spent fuel, giving India a green light to stockpile possibly tens of tons of weapons-usable plutonium (8kg is needed to make a nuclear weapon). This accumulated weapons-usable material increases the risk of nuclear terrorism because additional nuclear weapons-usable material may be diverted by terrorist groups seeking to make a nuclear weapon.
The perception that India will be able to significantly increase its nuclear weapons capability as a result of the nuclear deal will fuel a nuclear arms race in South Asia, as Pakistan acts to counter the rising threat from India. Pakistan's Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), which controls Pakistan’s nuclear assets, responded to the US-India deal, following an April 2006 meeting chaired by President Pervez Musharraf, stating that “In view of the fact that the agreement would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un-safeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met.”
Undermines U.S. strategic interests in Asia
Despite the enormous concession to India by the United States in the 123 agreement, India will not align its foreign policy decisions based on vital American interests related to China and Iran. The Prime Minister of India when discussing this agreement has repeatedly stated that it will retain its foreign policy independence. China and India have close economic ties; China is set to replace the United States as India’s most important trading partner, and India and China declared 2006 to be the year of Indian-Chinese friendship, expanding cultural exchanges between the two countries.
India has close energy and economic ties with Iran. India and Iran have signed a $7 billion deal related to the Iran-India natural gas pipeline despite U.S. opposition. In addition, India reportedly conducted joint military exercises last year with Iran, with Iranian naval ships docking in India. This military cooperation was part of a broad agreement signed in 2003 whereby India and Iran “decided to explore opportunities for cooperation in defense and agreed areas, including training and exchange of visits.” India has also repeatedly supported Iran’s right to its nuclear program.
In addition, several Indian companies and experts, including Indian chemical companies and nuclear scientists, have been sanctioned by the United States under the Iran Nonproliferation Act and the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act. The most recent sanctions were imposed in July 2006 for transferring technology that could be used by Iran for a weapons of mass destruction program.
Undermines nuclear non-proliferation
The US-India agreement creates a dangerous double-standard by rewarding India with nuclear technology reserved only for countries in good standing under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), despite India’s refusal to sign the NPT over decades. India is now being given access to nuclear trade without being required to make the meaningful non-proliferation commitments undertaken by all but four of the world’s countries.
The proposed U.S. exception for nuclear trade with India also already undermines U.S. efforts to convince other countries not to engage in nuclear trade with countries of concern. For example, China and Russia have attempted to transfer sensitive nuclear technology to Pakistan and Iran and have been pressured from doing so by the stringent rules of the current non-proliferation regime. By creating the precedent for an exception to be made, the United States will reopen the possibility for other partnerships and weaken its ability to object to deals that would cause us serious security concerns.
The perception of a double-standard will also undermine U.S. efforts to convince non-nuclear weapon states in good standing under the NPT to accept additional obligations under the NPT, such as tougher international inspections of their nuclear facilities.