Quotes

Experts and Former Senior Officials Warn About the Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal

Sen. Sam Nunn – Former Georgia Senator and Former Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Co-chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative

• "[The US-India nuclear deal] certainly does not curb in any way the proliferation of weapons-grade nuclear material….India was a lot better negotiator than we were.”

• “Congress has a duty to look at the broader framework. […] If I were still in Congress, I would be skeptical and looking at conditions that could be attached.”

Dr. Robert L. Gallucci – Former Ambassador at Large for the State Department; Former Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)

Sam Nunn, Interview in the Washington Post, March 21, 2006

• “If we do this, we will put at risk a world of very few nuclear weapons states, and open the door to the true proliferation of nuclear weapons in the years ahead.”

• “It will really do nothing to help us deal with the risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”

• “There is no reason why we should attach any positive value to India’s willingness to submit a few additional nuclear facilities of its choosing to international safeguards, so long as other fissile material producing facilities are free from safeguards.”

Robert L. Gallucci, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 26, 2006

Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush

• “I am concerned about a trend that we see reflected in the U.S.-India nuclear deal where we try to address proliferation risks by assessing the character of regimes and governments. Such an approach also opens up divisions among the world's nuclear powers, with each making a list of "friends" who can be trusted with nuclear technology and "foes" who are dangerous risks.”

Brent Scowcroft, “A Modest Proposal,” op-ed, National Interest, Spring 2006

Pres. Jimmy Carter, former US President and Nobel laureate for peace; founder of the Carter Center

• “The proposed nuclear deal with India is just one more step in opening a Pandora's box of nuclear proliferation…. Knowing for more than three decades of Indian leaders' nuclear ambitions, I and all other presidents included them in a consistent policy: no sales of civilian nuclear technology or uncontrolled fuel to any country that refused to sign the NPT.”

• “India may be a special case, but reasonable restraints are necessary. The five original nuclear powers have all stopped producing fissile material for weapons, and India should make the same pledge to cap its stockpile of nuclear bomb ingredients. Instead, the proposal for India would allow enough fissile material for as many as 50 weapons a year, far exceeding what is believed to be its current capacity.”

• “There is no doubt that condoning avoidance of the NPT encourages the spread of nuclear weaponry. Japan, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Argentina and many other technologically advanced nations have chosen to abide by the NPT to gain access to foreign nuclear technology. Why should they adhere to self-restraint if India rejects the same terms?”

Jimmy Carter, “A Dangerous Deal with India,” op-ed, The Washington Post, March 29, 2006

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter

• “[T]he recent U.S. decision to assist India's nuclear program, driven largely by the desire for India's support for the war in Iraq and as a hedge against China, has made the U.S. look like a selective promoter of nuclear weapons proliferation. This double standard will complicate the quest for a constructive resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem.”

Zbigniew Brzezinski, American Debacle, op-ed , October 9, 2005

Amb. Thomas Graham, Jr. (Ret.), former Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

• “This [U.S.-India proposed nuclear cooperation] Agreement will break the fragile balance of the NPT central bargain by permitting nuclear cooperation with an NPT non-recognized nuclear weapon state without requiring the nonproliferation undertakings that apply to nearly all states.”

• “A policy of selective application of NPT obligations is not sustainable…A successful NPT system must be based on law, not whether we like or dislike a particular nation.”

Thomas Graham, Jr. , Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform, September 26, 2006

Patrick J. Buchanan, former Republican presidential candidate

• "Apparently, at an all-night session on the last night in India, the U.S. negotiators capitulated to all of India's demands, lest Bush leave New Delhi with nothing to show for a trip halfway around the world but an agreement to import mangoes."

Patrick J. Buchanan, “What the Indian Giver Got,” March 12, 2006

Henry Sokolski, Former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under Paul Wolfowitz; President of the Nonproliferation Education Policy Center

• "It would appear as though we just basically wanted this agreement so badly we got it--badly."

• “[I]f India gets access to foreign uranium (as the U.S. nuclear deal provides), it will not only allow India to expand its civilian power program, but will also free up most of India’s domestic uranium to build more bombs. Pakistan has already responded by announcing plans to ramp up its military nuclear production.”

Henry Sokolski, “Unconditionally Bad,” National Review Online, June 26, 2006

Robert Einhorn, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation in the Clinton Administration; Senior Adviser at the Center for International and Strategic Studies

• "[Altering the rules in the NSG for India] sends the signal that bilateral relations and other strategic interests will trump nonproliferation. And that will reduce the perceived penalties associated with going nuclear."

Robert Einhorn, quoted in Bush Officials Defend Nuclear Deal, The Washington Post, July 20, 2005

• “The deal appears to give India complete freedom not just to continue but to expand its production of fissile material for nuclear weapons…In the future, any reactor it designates as 'military' can be used for the weapons program.”

Robert Einhorn, quoted in Nuclear Pact With India Seen As Surrender, Inter Press Service News Agency, March 3, 2006

Dr. Leonard Weiss, Consultant and former Staff Director of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; chief architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978

• “[a]n aggressive program of improved energy efficiency could substitute for all the future power output from nuclear reactors currently being planned in India between now and 2020.”

Leonard Weiss, “Power Points,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2006 pp. 21, 63 (vol. 62, no. 3)

• “This double standard favoring India is an example of America’s willingness to wash away the nuclear sins of its “friends” to achieve other foreign policy goals.”

• “Some nations may decide that if they withdraw from the [NPT], build nuclear weapons and wait long enough while avoiding antagonizing the United States, they will eventually get all the nuclear help they want.”

Leonard Weiss, “A high-stakes nuclear gamble,” The Los Angeles Times, December 29, 2005

• “In the case of India, George W. Bush is right to pursue stronger ties. But his administration was so eager for a deal that sufficient thought wasn't given to the implications of "an agreement at any cost" approach.”

Mark Brzezinski, former National Security Council staff in the Clinton administration

"The Bush Administration "was so eager for a deal that sufficient thought wasn't given to the implications of 'an agreement at any cost' approach."

"The administration went for a deal that would abandon a three-decade long policy that had cautiously approached nuclear collaboration because India used a civilian nuclear program to produce fissile material for weapons."

Mark Brzezinski, “The Challenge of Nuclear Deals,” The Boston Globe, October 28, 2007

Dr. Gary Milhollin, Professor Emeritus University of Wisconsin Law School and Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

"We've already heard the discussion about the possibility that India will place 14 of 22 reactors under inspection. It seems to me that that's a little bit like a person with a 22 room house who says that the police can inspect 14 rooms but not the other eight. Why would any policeman in his right mind accept that offer?"

Gary Milhollin, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 26, 2006