International Law

U.S.-India nuclear deal promotes nuclear weapons proliferation

Undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty bargain

The U.S.-India nuclear deal undermines the1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by making a special exception for India that runs contrary to a delicate global bargain that all but four of the world’s countries have accepted.

Recognizing that nuclear weapons proliferation gravely threatens the security of every country, the NPT embodies a commitment by the states that do not have nuclear weapons (approximately 180 countries) never to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. In exchange, the states that already had nuclear weapons in 1968 agreed to work toward the elimination of these weapons. They also agreed to assist the countries in good standing under the Treaty with peaceful uses of nuclear technology. However imperfect this bargain may seem, it has been instrumental in keeping the number of nuclear weapon states to fewer than 10. Every country in the world has signed the NPT except for India, Pakistan and Israel, and North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in 2003.

India has developed nuclear weapons and rejected repeated international calls for restraint in its nuclear weapons program (for example calls for India to join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and end its production of fissile material for nuclear weapons).

The proposed 123 agreement would reward India with the same rights reserved under international and U.S. law for states that abide by the NPT’s restrictions and support global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Moreover, the U.S.-India agreement permits India to reap the benefits of nuclear cooperation while expanding its capacity to produce nuclear weapons, even as the United States and Russia reduce their nuclear arsenals.

An exception for India would create a dangerous double-standard that would gravely undermine the delicate balance of benefits and obligations that underpin the NPT and its global non-proliferation framework. This may cause other states to reconsider their own commitments to this bargain as well as how far they are willing to go to help the United States enforce efforts to bring North Korea and Iran in line with nuclear non-proliferation norm.

Undermines international law

Multilateral regimes have long sought to operate beyond the different political agendas of member countries. The proposed arrangement could trigger a significant erosion of the guidelines of the 45-member Nuclear Supplies Group – a key control on the spread of nuclear materials. These international guidelines have been, and continue to be, an important barrier against the transfer of nuclear material, equipment, and technologies for weapons purposes.

However, now the United States is working to pressure the Nuclear Suppliers Group to agree to an exception for India. Setting this precedent could weaken both the international rules and compliance with these rules.

In addition, the deal undermines U.S. and international efforts to get NPT non-nuclear weapon states to take on additional legal obligations such as the Additional Protocol which provides for more effective inspections badly needed to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and prevent the theft or diversion of weapons-usable nuclear materials by terrorists.

Undermines decades of global non-proliferation efforts

By introducing this exception, the U.S.-India nuclear deal will set a dangerous precedent and risk opening the flood-gates for additional exceptions and trade policy based on economic profit rather than on sound nuclear non-proliferation policy. For decades, the United States has worked to keep the nuclear non-proliferation rules strong and has endeavored to ensure compliance with these rules, notably by China and Russia which produced positive results in recent years. However, now the United States is advocating making an exception in the very same rules that it has sought to strengthen and defend.

This deal is likely to result in additional exceptions. Russia has proposed resuming nuclear fuel exports to India’s Tarapur reactors (which U.S. diplomatic pressure had stalled until the U.S.-India deal was announced). In addition, Russia may use this precedent to transfer sensitive technology to Iran. Pakistan has sought a similar nuclear deal from China. And Israel has proposed a criteria-based, rather than country-specific, proposal to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. France, Russia and Australia for example are all seeking to sell material and technology to India if international rules are changed to allow the U.S.-India deal.

The deal also complicates on-going negotiations with Iran. Iran’s former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani referred to the U.S.-India deal when he argued that the United States enjoys extensive relations with India in the nuclear field despite India's nuclear weapons program, and noted that such a "dual standard" was detrimental to global security.