About the Deal
In July 2005, the United States and India announced a nuclear agreement that has significant consequences for U.S. and international security. The changes to U.S. law and the additional concessions made to India as a result of the subsequent negotiations, dangerously weaken U.S. and international non-proliferation efforts. They represent a dangerous precedent that will undermine the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable materials. The deal also fails to protect U.S. businesses as nuclear industries in other countries will likely reap the benefits of this ill-advised change in policy.
See further information about why the deal undermines U.S. security, international law, and endangers human life and health .
This deal to allow nuclear trade with India involves several steps and U.S. Congressional approval before the deal is finalized.
July 2005 announcement
Without consulting Congress, and changing thirty years of U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy, President Bush announced on July 18, 2005 that the United States would allow the transfer of nuclear technology and material to India. In exchange, India promises to continue its voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, to separate its civilian and military nuclear programs by opening 14 out of 22 reactors to inspections, and not to transfer the nuclear technology to third parties. However, India is not required to make meaningful non-proliferation commitments: India makes no binding commitment not to conduct further nuclear weapon tests, and refuses to work toward stopping the production of nuclear weapons-usable material. In fact, the deal will give India the capability to significantly expand its nuclear weapons production.
March 2006 separation plan
In March 2006, India proposed a separation agreement for its nuclear program, outlining that 14 reactors would be used for nuclear power and subject to inspection, while 8 reactors would be used for India’s nuclear weapon program. The plutonium-separating facilities (reprocessing) and plutonium producing fast reactors would be off-limits to inspections and India maintains the right to determine whether future reactors will be civilian or military. In addition, the reactor that Canada helped India build for peaceful purposes in the 1950s and 1960s which India used to produce material for its nuclear weapons will not be open to inspection, and will instead be shut down in 2010.
Henry Hyde Act of 2006
Congress approved changes to U.S. law in late 2006 by passing the Henry J. Hyde Act to allow the deal but included several conditions. These conditions include restrictions on the trade of sensitive nuclear technology, the clear intent to stop nuclear trade if India conducts a nuclear weapon test, the right to seek the return of nuclear material if India tests, and urging India to cooperate with the United States regarding the problem of Iran’s nuclear program.
U.S.-Indian 123 nuclear cooperation agreement (finalized in July 2007)
The United States had to negotiate a follow-on arrangement with India called a Section 123 nuclear cooperation agreement. Congress (House and Senate) will have to approve this agreement, which the Administration hopes will be voted on in early 2008. The United States made additional concessions to India during the negotiation and finalization of this agreement, several of which do not conform to the clear conditions of the Hyde Act.
- The Hyde Act stipulates that the India-specific waiver of U.S. restrictions on trade with India would end if India resumes testing (section 104(a)(3)(B)). The 123 agreement does not draw a clear line if India tests a nuclear weapon.
- The Hyde Act requires that the U.S. retain the right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment subject to the agreement if India resumes testing or terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement (section 123(a)(4)). However the new U.S.-India 123 agreement is silent on both points.
- The Hyde Act explicitly states that it should be the policy of the United States to seek to prevent other countries from providing India with nuclear material or technology (section 103(a)(6)). However, the 123 agreement commits the U.S. to help India in securing fuel supplies if New Delhi suffers any disruption in fuel supplies.
- The Hyde Act prohibits the transfer to India of sensitive technology unless certain conditions are met (section 103(a)(6)). The 123 agreement repeatedly provides India with access to “full civil nuclear cooperation.”
- The 123 agreement authorizes India to reprocess spent fuel produced as a result of the U.S.-India deal, which will allow India to stockpile an unlimited amount of nuclear weapons-usable material.
- The agreement allows India to build up a “strategic reserve” of fuel, leaving the amount ambiguous and open to interpretation.
- The agreement endorses undefined and ambiguous “India-specific” safeguards.
Indian-IAEA safeguards agreement (negotiations on-going)
Before Congress can approve the 123 agreement which allows nuclear trade between the United States and India, India and the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) must make substantial progress toward negotiating an Indian-IAEA safeguards agreement the IAEA Board of Governors will have to approve. These negotiations have been delayed due to opposition to the deal in India but these negotiations resumed in November 2007. India is insisting on “India-specific” safeguards.
Changes to the Nuclear Suppliers Group's international guidelines
Congress must also wait for the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, which governs trade in nuclear technology and nuclear material, to approve by consensus changes to its guidelines that currently restrict trade to non-nuclear-weapon states, such as India (India is considered a non-nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty definition), that do not accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities.